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This paper analyzes the role of institutions in price dispersion among cities in the 
European region in the 1996-2009 period. An overview of the literature on the 
border effect reveals that the role of institutions is completely neglected. Using the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators as explanatory variables I find that the better 
the institutions, the lower the predicted dispersion. The result is robust to different 
specifications of the regression model and it is consistent with a hypothesis that 
arbitrage, as an entrepreneurial activity and the main power behind the law of one 
price, is influenced by institutional quality. 
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There are two major puzzles in international economics that are closely related to each other. 
First, there seems to be a large home bias in trade. And second, real exchange rates seem to be 
much more volatile, and deviations from the purchasing power parity (PPP) more persistent 
than justifiable by economic theory. The amount of the unexplained missing trade, size and per-
sistence of the PPP deviations, and the factors influencing them are the subject of this text.  
“How is it possible to reconcile the extremely high short-term volatility of real exchange rates 
with the glacial rate…at which deviations from PPP seem to die out?” (Rogoff, 1996, p. 664). The 
answer to this question is linked to the so-called law of one price (LOP), a disaggregated version 
of the PPP. The reason why the LOP should hold is that if it were possible to buy a particular 
good in one place, transport it to another place and still sell with profit, such arbitrages would 
tend to equalize the prices in both locations. It is not surprising that in a world of high transpor-
tation and other transaction costs the deviations from the LOP were large and very long-lived, as 
Volckart and Wolf (2006) show in their example of Medieval Europe. 
However, even today the functioning of the LOP is still very slow and imperfect with long-lasting 
price dispersion between states. A vast literature deals with this paradox, calling the unex-
plained part of price differentials a “border effect”, i.e. the impact of the existence of national 
borders on trade. The general conclusion is that there isn’t nearly as much international trade as 
the standard models suggest there should be, while the formal barriers such as various tariffs 
are too low to explain the revealed missing trade (J. E. Anderson, 2000, p. 115). The first wave of 
studies in the second half of the 1990s only addressed the size of this border effect (Engel & 
Rogers, 1996; McCallum, 1995). Only recently have authors started to explain it, i.e. look for oth-
er explanatory variables in addition to transportation costs and reduce the extent of the unex-
plained residuum. 
Many authors estimate the size of the border effect and explain the role of various factors in-
fluencing cross-border price dispersion (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Parsley & Wei, 2007; Wolszczak-
Derlacz, 2008a). The underlying idea in their studies is that arbitrage is a process which should 
automatically equalize the prices in different places once we remove the influence of these fac-
tors. However, arbitrage is an entrepreneurial activity and as such should be influenced by insti-
tutional quality. The reason is that low-quality institutions can impose prohibitive costs to arbi-
trage in the same way as large distances between cities or high tariffs. And contrary to, e.g. dis-
tance or language differences, the institutional quality is improvable making it potentially sub-
ject to economic policy. However, the role of institutions is completely neglected by existing lite-
rature on the border effect. The main hypothesis of this paper is that institutional quality signifi-
cantly influences the extent of the price dispersion. 
First, I provide an overview of the existing literature and various approaches to border-effect 
analysis and present the existing results. Then, I propose a theoretical explanation of the role of 
institutions in the functioning of the LOP. And finally, in the last section of this text I carry out a 
regression analysis to empirically assess the impact of several factors, including institutional 
quality on the cross-border price dispersion. 2 
 
2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
TRADE APPROACH 
Formally, research takes on two distinct ways of estimating and explaining the border effect. The 
first stream of authors, starting with McCallum (1995), try to explore how borders affect trade 
by looking at the difference between intra- and international trade after controlling for distance 
and some other variables. First studies found that the trade inside countries is, controlling for 
distance, more than twenty times larger than trade with a foreign country (Helliwell, 1996; 
McCallum, 1995). With more consistent data the border effect on trade is lowered to about one 
half using the same model specification (M. A. Anderson & Smith, 1999), controlling for the re-
moteness of trading partners further lowers the unexplained portion of missing trade (Helliwell, 
1997; Wei, 1996). 
A serious problem with the gravity model specification used is that it estimates significant bor-
der effects also at the subnational level between individual US states (H. C. Wolf, 2000). But, us-
ing more theoretically grounded measures of effective internal distance, the border effect among 
US states drops significantly to about a half of its former value (Head & Mayer, 2002). The sepa-
ration of wholesale and manufacturing shipments together with the use of actual distances of 
shipments lowers the border effect, i.e. the ratio of actual to predicted trade flows inside the US, 
to 1.5 (Hillberry & Hummels, 2003). The border effect in the EU decreases with the use of effec-
tive distance measures from about 20 to 4.2 (Head & Mayer, 2002). Technical barriers to trade 
and currency barriers also have a sizable impact on the magnitude of the border effect (Chen, 
2004; de Sousa & Lochard, 2005). 
To sum up, the missing trade stemming from the gravity model is to a large degree caused by 
incorrect internal distance data. The correct internal distance measure and suitable data on 
trade flows leads to a reasonably small border effect, which has its source mainly in various 
trade barriers. 
PRICE APPROACH 
Another way of measuring the border effect was introduced by Engel and Rogers (1996) who 
showed that the standard deviation of relative prices in US and Canadian cities is systematically 
higher for cross-border city pairs than for city pairs within the same country. According to their 
estimates, the US-Canada border adds a variability equivalent of 75,000 miles of distance. The 
big advantage of this approach is that it does not suffer from the above-mentioned problems 
with distance measures and intranational trade – the geographical distance between two cities is 
easy to obtain. It has been found that short-run deviations from the purchasing power parity are 
strongly linked to the nominal exchange rate variability (Engel & Rogers, 2001), but the explana-
tory power is considerably reduced when looking at long-run deviations (Bergin & Glick, 2007; 
Parsley & Wei, 2001; Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008a). Even though the fixation of exchange rates 
through the introduction of a common currency should evidently reduce price dispersion, em-
pirical investigations of euro introduction lead only to mixed results (Allington, Kattuman, & 
Waldmann, 2005; Engel & Rogers, 2004; Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008b). 
Some parts of the border effect can be explained by various biases and arbitrage costs such as 
tariffs (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Parsley & Wei, 2007), transportation costs per unit of distance 
(Bergin & Glick, 2007; Parsley & Wei, 2001), or language, tax, and income differences in respec-3 
 
tive countries (Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008a). Also, it has been found that the aggregation of prices 
tends to bias the estimated border effect upwards (Broda & Weinstein, 2008; Imbs, Mumtaz, 
Ravn, & Rey, 2005), but when comparing the results obtained using disaggregated price data and 
official price indexes, the differences are relatively minor (Crucini & Shintani, 2008). Controlling 
for the share of non-traded inputs decreases the border effect significantly (Crucini & Shintani, 
2008; Crucini, Telmer, & Zachariadis, 2005). Introducing sticky prices and sticky information 
into the model can further decrease the unexplained part of the price dispersion credited to the 
existence of national borders (Crucini, Shintani, & Tsuruga, 2008). 
Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) point out that cross-country heterogeneity in price dispersion 
can bias the border effect upwards due to the incorrect identification of the effect in the used 
models. However, a significant border effect between the US and Canada is also found using the 
regression discontinuity approach, which is immune to this identification problem (Gopinath, 
Gourinchas, Hsieh, & Li, 2009), as well as by countries that have very similar within-country 
price dispersion patterns (Horváth, Rátfai, & Döme, 2008). 
To conclude the literature review, there is a consensus that the border effect exists and is sub-
stantial even after controlling for many potential sources of this excess price variability. 
3. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
The studies introduced in the previous section use a number of factors to explain the observed 
dispersion of prices between cross-border city pairs. The underlying idea is that after we control 
for the most important sources of distortions, the prices in different places should equalize as a 
consequence of arbitrage existence. However, arbitrage is not an automatic equilibrating 
process, it is an entrepreneurial activity. As Kirzner (1997, p. 70) points out, “each market is 
characterized by opportunities for pure entrepreneurial profit. The…entrepreneur…buys where 
prices are ‘too low’ and sells where prices are ‘too high’. In this way…price discrepancies are 
narrowed in the equilibrative direction.” 
In a similar manner, Baumol, Litan, and Schramm (2007, p. 3) understand an entrepreneur to be 
“any entity, new or existing, that provides a new product or service or that develops and uses 
new methods to produce or deliver existing goods and services at lower cost”. The goods do not 
travel from where they are cheaper to where they are more expensive by themselves; the prices 
do not automatically equalize. It is a process run by the entrepreneurs who have to discover 
profit opportunities. The profitability of arbitrage is then influenced by a number of different 
costs, such as tariffs or transportation costs. However, it is not the lack of entrepreneurship that 
leads to deviations from the LOP. Building on Schumpeter and Kirzner, Baumol (1990, p. 894, 
emphasis in the original) notes that, “Entrepreneurs are always with us and always play some 
substantial role. But…some of those roles do not follow the constructive and innovative script 
that is conventionally attributed to that person.…How the entrepreneur acts at a given time and 
place depends heavily on the rules of the game – the reward structure in the economy – that 
happen to prevail.” 
In other words, if the institutional framework induces prohibitive costs to engage in innovative 
or arbitrage activities, the entrepreneurs will direct their efforts to other activities, often unpro-
ductive, such as rent seeking. As a consequence, in addition to the already-introduced costs of 
arbitrage such as those caused by the distance between cities, language differences, or trade 4 
 
barriers, the quality of institutions should also influence the attractiveness of arbitrage activities. 
But its role in the existing literature on the border effect is almost completely ignored. 
Due to the unavailability of suitable data, I will not test the direct link from institutions to entre-
preneurship and price dispersion, but only indirectly from institutions to price dispersion. It is, 
therefore, possible that the institutional quality influences the price differentials through some 
other channel. Research on the topic of entrepreneurial productivity, however, suggests that the 
link between institutional quality and the activities of entrepreneurs indeed exists. Baumol 
(1990) provides several examples of various historical periods and shows how changing institu-
tional frameworks through the allocation of resources between the productive and unproductive 
affected the innovativeness and spread of technological discoveries. 
Aidis and Estrin (2006) address the relationship of institutions and productive entrepreneur-
ship in today’s Russia. Even though they do so very informally, they emphasize several interest-
ing differences between Russian and Chinese self-help institutions based on social networks. 
While in China this system has evolved into a tool used to overcome the absence of well-defined 
property rights and contract enforcement, this was not the case in Russia, where the network is 
primarily used as a means for corruption (Hsu, 2005; Wu & Huang, 2006). Aidis and Estrin find 
that the entry rates of new firms in Russia are deep below the rates commonly observed both in 
developed and developing countries. 
A more formal test of the link between institutional quality and the productivity of entrepre-
neurship is provided by Sobel (2008). He uses the Economic Freedom of North America index as 
a measure of institutional quality and several proxies for productive and unproductive entre-
preneurship. As proxies for the productive, Sobel uses venture capital investments per capita, 
patents per capita, the growth rate of self-employment activity, the establishment birth rate, and 
the large firm establishment birth rate. To proxy for unproductive entrepreneurship, he uses 
three different measures of the number of political and lobbying organizations in each state’s 
capital and an index measuring judicial quality, where states scoring poorly have generally sig-
nificant levels of legal fraud and abuse. As expected, institutional quality is positively correlated 
with measures of productive entrepreneurship, and negatively with measures of unproductive 
entrepreneurship, no matter what measure is used. 
In this text I use the theory of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship to argue that insti-
tutional quality may be one of the determinants of the size of the border effect. In order to test 
this hypothesis, I will express the quality of institutions as one of the factors influencing the total 
costs of arbitrage by including various measures of institutional quality into the set of variables 
used to explain price dispersion. The theoretical prediction is that the better the institutions, the 
smaller the deviations from the LOP. 
4. DATA 
In the analysis I use data on actual retail prices, not price indexes. The information on prices 
comes from the Worldwide Cost of Living surveys conducted twice a year by the Economist In-
telligence Unit (EIU). The main target market for the data source is managers who use it to com-
pare the costs of living in different world cities and estimate compensation for relocating em-
ployees. Even though the goods included in the survey to some degree reflect this target, the 
sample overlaps sufficiently with a typical urban consumption basket. Generally, the use of ac-5 
 
tual prices could be problematic mainly because a) the price data are collected from a small 
number of stores compared to the number of outlets surveyed by national statistical agencies 
when constructing various indexes, b) the price data come only from large cities which do not 
have to be fully representative of whole countries, and c) the list of tracked items does not 
represent the whole consumption basket (Engel & Rogers, 2004; Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008b). 
In order to test the reliability of the EIU data, Crucini and Shintani (2008) compare the half-lives 
of aggregated EIU prices with official CPI statistics and find that both datasets are practically 
identical. Similarly, Rogers (2002) finds out that a) price indexes constructed from the EIU data 
share important characteristics with the Penn World Tables and OECD intersectoral data sets, 
and b) the correlation between EIU price changes and the annual official CPI inflation rate is 
positive and large. Moreover, PPP rates resulting from EIU prices are comparable to the PPP 
rates reported by the OECD. It seems, therefore, that it is possible to use the EIU dataset without 
inducing any type of bias into the results. 
The major advantage of using actual prices compared to the use of price indexes is the possibili-
ty to construct a measure of the average dispersion of the individual prices between two places 
in one time period. Price indexes also have the disadvantage of including both traded- and non-
traded goods and lack important pieces of information due to the aggregation – price deviations 
with opposite signs can cancel each other out. 
The survey covers 140 cities in 93 countries and consists of local prices for more than 160 indi-
vidual goods. Among the goods are products such as “white bread (1 kg)”, “paperback novel (at 
bookstore)”, and “women’s cardigan sweater” or services like “man’s haircut (tips included)”. 
The prices of many goods in the survey are collected from two types of outlets: supermarkets 
and mid-priced stores. In this paper, only prices from the supermarket or lower-price outlets are 
used, since they are more likely to be comparable across different regions. The data are annual 
and collected since 1990, but due to limitations of institutional quality data only the 1996-2009 
period is used in the analysis. All prices are expressed in euros. 
Forty cities from 31 countries in the European region are chosen, together with 134 goods 
(listed in Appendix Table A1, Table A2, and Table A3).1
In order to study the impact of institutional quality, data from the Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators project (WGI) are used. They cover six dimensions of governance over the 1996-2009 
period: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption. The first two dimensions capture the processes by which 
governments are selected, monitored, and replaced. Government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality assess the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and implement sound poli-
cies. The last two indicators measure the respect of both citizens and the state for the institu-
 The choice of cities is based on the avail-
ability of both price data and institutional quality data. Products and services are grouped into 
eight different categories to allow for a more detailed overview of price development. The dis-
tinction between traded and non-traded goods is a common sense one and follows the classifica-
tion used by other authors (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Engel & Rogers, 2004). 
                                                             
1 Some of the available items were not included: Prices of cigarettes, tobacco, electricity, gas, water, heat-
ing oil, road tax and automobile registration fees are often regulated and therefore cannot be expected to 
converge. The second group of excluded items consists of goods and services which are not very suitable 
for international comparison because their quality can vary significantly: cars, office and residential rents, 
insurance, and prices of schools, healthcare, and sports. 6 
 
tions that govern economic and social interactions between them (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruz-
zi, 2010, p. 4). 
The WGI gets the data from 31 different sources of four kinds: commercial business information 
providers, surveys of firms and households, non-governmental organizations, and public sector 
data providers. Altogether, more than 400 variables are used to compute the indicators. This 
should lead to greater precision of data compared to any individual data source. 
5. MEASURING PRICE DISPERSION 
My goal is to measure the scope of deviations from the LOP across cities in different markets and 
its development over time. Moreover, I want to estimate the influence of various city- and coun-
try-specific factors on the size of the deviations. In order to do so, following the other studies 
(Bergin & Glick, 2007; Engel, Rogers, & Wang, 2003; Horváth et al., 2008), relative log prices 
between all available city pairs are formed. To be more specific, let 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  be the price of good 𝑘 in 
city 𝑖 at time 𝑡 expressed in euros. For a given pair of cities (𝑖,𝑗), the relative price for a given 




𝑘   (1)  
where the lower case denotes logs. 
In order to capture the costs of arbitrage, a price dispersion measure is constructed. Existing 
papers generally use two types of average dispersion measures. I decided to use both as a ro-
bustness check and find out if the choice of dispersion measure affects the final results. The first 
measure is a standard deviation of 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡










  (2)  
where 𝐾 is the set of products, 𝐾𝑁 is the number of products, and 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑘 �  is the average relative price 
over all the products from the set for city pair 𝑖𝑗. 
The second measure is a mean square error of 𝑞𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑘  across all products 𝑘: 




𝐾𝑁 �   (3)  
where 𝐾 is, again, the set of products and 𝐾𝑁 is the number of products. The only difference be-
tween the SD and MSE is that the SD removes the city-pair fixed effects. That is, the MSE not only 
measures dispersion, but also the average distance of relative prices from zero. Potentially, there 
are 820 city pairs, each with up to 20 yearly observations. This gives us a sample of a maximum 
of 16,400 observations. After the exclusion of missing observations, 13,004 observations of price 
dispersion are left. Appendix Table A4 provides a brief statistical summary of both measures – 
there is, obviously, enough variance in the sample. 
Some studies directly use the relative log price as a measure of price dispersion between the two 
cities (Engel et al., 2003). However, this approach is not consistent with the theory behind the 
LOP. Deviations from an equilibrium price level of a good exist because for some reason the 7 
 
forces of arbitrage are not functioning. Whatever the sources of arbitrage failure may be, it is 
possible to represent them by a band of no-arbitrage, within which the differences in the price of 
one good between two places are too small to enable arbitrage with profit (Parsley & Wei, 
2001). 
As a simple example, we can imagine a world where there are only two barriers to trade: trans-
portation costs and tariffs. These two costs give rise to a band, or interval, where the prices of a 
particular product in two distinct cities are too close to each other, i.e. the relative price is too 
close to zero, to allow for a profit-making arbitrage. Arbitrage would start to work only after the 
relative price leaves this band. In a world of no other obstacles to trade, the correction of an 
excess price difference would be instantaneously bringing the relative price back into the band 
where no further profitable arbitrage would be possible. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
However, the band’s width does not have to be constant all the time. Suppose, for example, that 
in 1994 the tariff is lowered. As a consequence, arbitrage would be profitable with the lower 
absolute values of relative prices, i.e. with a smaller price difference. The band of no-arbitrage 
can also widen, for example due to higher oil prices that then increase transportation costs. 








The relative price inside the band of no-arbitrage follows a random walk process. As long as it is 
inside the band, the price difference can move in any direction regardless of the arbitrage con-
straints symbolized by the band’s width. Using the absolute value of the relative price itself as a 
measure of dispersion is, therefore, not appropriate because we are not able to observe the 
width of the no-arbitrage band and distinguish between the random movement of the relative 
price inside the band and the change of the width of the band. But, only the second case is a phe-
nomenon that could be explained by changes in external factors. 
It is possible to estimate the width of the no-arbitrage band by observing the many realizations 
of relative prices between two cities and calculating their dispersion. There is, of course, an im-
plicit assumption that the relative price fluctuations use the whole band width. In other words, if 
due to any reason the prices move in a band narrower than the no-arbitrage band both before 
and after the change of external factors influencing the costs of arbitrage, as illustrated in Figure 
2, then even this method fails. Such a situation is, however, very improbable given the level of 
world market integration as would happen only in the case of immense trade barriers. Both 
measures of dispersion are formed for ten different product sets: 1) perishable food and non-
alcoholic beverages, 2) non-perishable food and non-alcoholic beverages, 3) clothing and foot-
wear, 4) alcoholic beverages, 5) recreational products, 6) personal care products, and 7) house-
hold supplies together with a few other items form the group of 8) traded goods which, together 
































































































































































Figure 3: SD 
 
Figure 4: MSE 
 
 
Figure 5: SD for different categories 
 
 
Figure 6: MSE for different categories 
 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 present both dispersion measures averaged over all city pairs, i.e.: 
  𝑆𝐷𝖤𝖥 �,𝑡 = � 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑖𝑗∈𝐶
𝐶𝑁 �  
𝑀𝑆𝐸𝖤𝖥 �,𝑡 = � 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑖𝑗∈𝐶
𝐶𝑁 �  
(4)  
where 𝐶 is the set of city pairs, and 𝐶𝑁 is the number of available city pairs in time 𝑡. A U-pattern 
is evident for both dispersion measures during the 1990-2002 period, which corresponds to the 
findings of other authors using micro-data  (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Engel & Rogers, 2004; 
Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008a). Bergin and Glick (2007) find it especially surprising given the rise of 
Internet usage and the continuous integration of markets leading to higher price transparency. 
However, as I have explained above, the known existence of a non-zero relative price is only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for arbitrage to take place. The evidence merely sug-
gests that after a period of arbitrage-costs decrease, since 1997 the zone of no-arbitrage has 
widened again. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that the rough pattern is also present when disaggregating to indi-
vidual product groups. Not surprisingly, the highest dispersion over the whole observed period 
is shown in the group of non-traded goods. On the other hand, the lowest variation in relative 
prices belongs to the group of recreational products, which is also expected given the items in-












































































































































































































































































































































































There is one interesting difference between the two used dispersion measures. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, a sharp decline in MSE is documented which is not mirrored in the SD. The rest of 
the series development is very similar for both measures. As I mentioned before, the only differ-
ence between the MSE and SD is that the SD ignores the mean, i.e. the city-pair fixed effect. Be-
cause we averaged across all city pairs, a decline in the MSE which is not accompanied by a de-
cline in the SD signals that, on average, the no-arbitrage band moved closer to zero without 
changing its width. 
Given the time period, one hypothesis suggests itself: Price levels in countries that opened their 
markets by the fall of Socialism at the end of 1980s should converge with a higher pace to price 
levels in other economies. Suppose, for example, that in 1990 all prices in West Germany were 
higher than in the Czech Republic. If between 1990 and 1991 all prices in the Czech Republic 
(expressed in ECU) increase by approximately the same proportion, the standard deviation of 
the relative prices would remain intact but the mean square error would decrease substantially. 
And, indeed, the data seem to provide support for this hypothesis. Table 1 shows city pairs with 
the highest differences between the 1993 and 1990 dispersion measured as mean square error. 
The first 61 positions are occupied by pairs where one of the cities is Warsaw, Prague, or Budap-
est. No such pattern is observable using the standard deviation. 
Table 1: Top MSE differences between 1993 and 1990 
#  City 1  City 2  Δ MSE  #  City 1  City 2  Δ MSE 
1.  Helsinki  Warsaw  2.534066  11.  Barcelona  Warsaw  1.678679 
2.  Helsinki  Prague  2.464104  12.  Paris  Warsaw  1.622458 
3.  Prague  Stockholm  2.256737    …  …  … 
4.  Stockholm  Warsaw  2.236346  40.  Budapest  Helsinki  1.254125 
5.  Oslo  Warsaw  2.007358    …  …  … 
6.  Warsaw  Zurich  1.997984  48.  Budapest  Stockholm  1.072657 
7.  Oslo  Prague  1.979630    …  …  … 
8.  London  Warsaw  1.835583  62.  Moscow  Zurich  0.654976 
9.  Dublin  Warsaw  1.729069    …  …  … 
10.  Prague  Zurich  1.711344  66.  Helsinki  Lisbon  0.602652 
6. EXPLAINING PRICE DISPERSION 
Authors of existing studies came up with a large number of different variables to explain the 
excessive cross-border price dispersion. Distance as a proxy for transportation costs is included 
in all of them. The nominal exchange rate volatility also proved to be positively correlated with 
price dispersion (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Engel & Rogers, 2001; Parsley & Wei, 2001, 2007; 
Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008a). Other factors explaining some part of the border effect are a com-
mon language in cities, taxes and income levels in respective countries, as well as the trade in-
tensity between them (Wolszczak-Derlacz, 2008a). 
Tariff rates significantly correlate with price dispersion (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Parsley & Wei, 
2007). Furthermore, the consideration of inputs tradability allows a more precise classification 
of products, revealing that a part of the dispersion attributed to the existence of borders may be 
explained by the existence of non-traded inputs, even to highly tradable goods (Crucini & Shin-
tani, 2008; Crucini et al., 2005). Last but not least, distance is not an ideal proxy for transporta-
tion costs because the real costs per unit of distance do not have to be constant in time. The in-10 
 
clusion of a measure of unit transportation costs also explains part of the cross-border price 
dispersion (Bergin & Glick, 2007; Parsley & Wei, 2001). 
I will focus on the neglected role of institutions influencing the business environment, as ex-
plained in Section 3, and will control for the usual variable – the distance between cities. As a 
robustness check, I will control for potential non-institutional sources of the variation in the 
institutional quality measure. 
The distance between cities is used as a proxy variable for transportation costs, which are ex-
pected to influence the width of the no-arbitrage zone. I calculate the distance between cities 
using the great circle formula. The problem of distance as a proxy for transportation costs is not 
only the absence of unit costs, but also the fact that types of transport, as well as the quality of 
infrastructure can drastically vary case to case. Some kind of effective distance measure would 
be more appropriate. However, due to data limitations, simple geographical distance is used. 
All six available measures of institutional quality from the WGI project are highly correlated, 
with the lowest correlation coefficient over 88%. Based on the theory presented in Section 3, the 
regulatory quality measure should best represent the analyzed institutional quality. According 
to Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010, p. 4), it captures “perceptions of the ability of the gov-
ernment to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. In order to test this hypothesis, I ran the regression (5) with the 
standard deviation as the dependent variable and with each of the six institutional measures in 
place of the institutional explanatory variable. Appendix Table A5 shows that the regulatory 
quality measure is indeed able to explain the largest part of the variation in the price dispersion. 
The regulatory quality measure also has the largest estimated coefficient, even after rescaling all 
of the institutional measures to [0-1] variables. 
The regulatory quality from the WGI project is therefore used as an institutional quality meas-
ure. Until 2002 the indexes were calculated only every other year. The values in 1997, 1999, and 
2001 are averages of the value in the previous and the following year. For each city pair, the in-
stitutional measure is constructed as a plain sum of levels attributed to the countries in which 
the cities are located. The higher value of institutional measure indicates better institutional 
quality. A better quality of institutions is expected to be correlated with a lower dispersion be-
cause good regulations lower the expected costs of entrepreneurial activity, making the costs of 
arbitrage smaller. 
The standard deviation and mean square error of traded goods are used as dependent variables: 
  𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1 ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑗 + 𝗼2𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝗼3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗,𝑡
+ � 𝗽𝑡𝑌 𝑡
2009
𝑡=1997
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡  (5)  
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is either 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑗,𝑡, or 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑌 𝑡 are year fixed effects to capture the time-varying fac-
tors influencing all city pairs. Variance is clustered on the country-pair level to allow for intra-
group correlation. All estimates are done using the OLS estimator. 
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Table 2: Regression results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 












































                     




















                     




















                     




















                     




















                     




















                     




















                     




















City fixed effects                     
Observations  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088  9955  10088  10088 
Adjusted R2  0.527  0.321  0.522  0.534  0.324  0.548  0.356  0.526  0.696  0.561 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; variance is clustered at the country-pair level. All specifications but (3) include year fixed effects. Year effects are 
plotted in Figure 7 and Figure 8. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2 presents the regressions results. Column 1 shows a regression with the SD as the price 
dispersion measure, Column 2 shows results when using the MSE. In both cases the coefficients 
are highly significant and have expected signs. Cities further apart and those separated by a na-
tional border have a higher price dispersion. The institutions effect is not only statistically signif-
icant but also economically relevant. Only the change of the regulatory quality variable in 2009 
when switching from the Prague-St. Petersburg to Prague-Stockholm pair induces a decrease in 
the price dispersion measured as the SD by 0.108, which is almost one standard deviation of the 
measure. This result confirms the hypothesis formulated in Section 3. 
I plot the coefficients for year dummies to see whether the used explanatory variables are suffi-
cient to model the pattern observed in the price dispersion measures. Figure 7 and Figure 8 
show that the pattern is still observable. To formally test it, I replace the year dummies with a 
quadratic time trend. 
Figure 7: Year fixed effects (incl. 95% conf. inter-
vals), specification (1) 
 
Figure 8: Year fixed effects (incl. 95% conf. inter-
vals), specification (2) 
 
 
Column 3 of Table 2 reports that the time trend is statistically significant and forms a parabola 
opened down with its peak in 2004. Qualitatively the same results are obtained when using the 
MSE as the dispersion measure, and are, therefore, not reported. 
Theoretically, the role of institutions should be more important in the case of cross-border city 
pairs. No special permission in most cases is needed to trade among cities inside one country. It 
is, therefore, not necessary to communicate with the regulatory authorities in such cases. More-
over, existing retailers already buy their goods from some wholesalers in their countries. Switch-
ing to a different wholesaler or arbitrage from another retailer in the case of lower prices and, as 
a consequence, higher profit margins shouldn’t be a complicated process dependent on institu-
tional quality. 
On the other hand, trade across borders is connected with significantly larger risks. The arbitra-
geurs have to deal with people they don’t know, often with completely dissimilar cultural back-
grounds. They cannot use the social networks they use in their domestic country. They have to 
be familiarized with unknown regulations and deal with customs and tax officers. In a nutshell, 
when trading across national borders, institutional quality should become much more impor-
tant. To test this hypothesis, I add an interaction term border*regulatory quality among the ex-
planatory variables. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 present the results of this amended regression. 
The interaction term is significant and negative for both specifications, which is consistent with 
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within one country is very small (222) compared to the number of cross-border city pairs, which 
can also cause the loss of significance of the original regulatory quality explanatory variable. 
7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Appendix Table A6 reports the results for individual product categories. All of them show the 
significant impact of border and institutional quality on price dispersion. Distance is also signifi-
cant in all but two cases. However, certain categories have a very low R-squared which indicates 
that the model used to explain the extent of price dispersion is not very suitable for these cate-
gories. A low goodness of fit can have two sources: First, the width of the no-arbitrage band may 
be incorrectly identified, since the number of included items is very limited in categories other 
than perishable and non-perishable food, clothing, and non-traded goods. And second, some 
categories of products may have a specific process of price setting which is not captured by the 
model. This could be the case of alcoholic beverages which have, together with personal care 
products, a larger estimated border effect than non-traded goods.  
Many authors include city fixed effects to their regressions. Results with city fixed effects are in 
Columns 9 and 10 in Table 2. The impact of institutional quality is still statistically significant for 
both dispersion measures, but the border loses its explanatory power when using the MSE 
measure. Given the fact that the only difference between the measures is that the MSE includes 
city-pair fixed effects, the city fixed effects probably are able to explain a large part of them and 
take on the explanatory power of the border. 
The robustness of the proposed model is also checked by including the GDP per capita as a 
measure of the respective country’s wealth. The reason is that the model could suffer from en-
dogeneity – the wealth of the country could influence both the price dispersion and the quality of 
institutions. It is true that the GDP per capita and the quality of institutions are highly correlated; 
their correlation coefficient is above 0.73. However, the GDP per capita is able to explain only 
54.3 % of the variation in the quality of institutions. And as Column 8 in Table 2 shows, including 
the GDP per capita doesn’t remove the explanatory power of the institutional quality. 
As described above, the regulatory quality measure for each city pair is constructed as a sum of 
both cities’ indicators. The reason for this is that we expect city pairs with better institutions, 
conditional on their distance, to be more arbitrage-friendly, thereby with lower differences in 
the prices of traded products. One other approach of estimating the role of institutions is, how-
ever, also possible: we can, instead of sums, look at differences in institutional quality. The larger 
the difference, the more dispersed the prices should be. 
To illustrate this idea in an example, suppose we choose two cities, e.g. Dublin and Moscow. If 
there are better quality institutions in Dublin, then the deviations from the LOP should be small-
er there than in Moscow, where the institutional quality is lower, because Dublin is easily access-
ible for arbitrage activities. As a consequence, relative prices should be more dispersed between 
these two cities, conditional on distance and other factors, than between e.g. Dublin and Berlin. 
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 2 report the results for the regression where for each city pair the sum 
of institutional indicators is replaced with their absolute-value difference. Regardless of the dis-
persion measure used, the impact of differences in institutional quality is significant and of ex-
pected direction. 14 
 
We might also be interested in a more detailed analysis of the various aspects of the institutional 
framework. In order to test the robustness of the findings, I used a number of indicators pro-
vided by the World Bank.2 Table A7  Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix   present the results of regres-
sions with five additional explanatory variables rescaled to [0-1] to allow a comparison of the 
size of their impact. The tertiary school enrollment rate is chosen to test whether the used ag-
gregate institutional quality indicator isn’t only a proxy for the level of development of the econ-
omy. The other used variables capture tax and the tax administration burden, tariffs, and impor-
tation costs. Even though it is revealed that the school enrollment rate and some of the other 
variables do play a significant role in explaining deviations from the LOP, the regulatory quality 
is still statistically significant and of expected sign. 
Only after adding the importation time as another independent variable, the explanatory power 
of the regulatory quality disappears regardless of the dispersion measure used as reported in 
Columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table A7. However, importation time captures the time needed for 
importing a 20-ft container load of general cargo and includes the waiting time at a border or 
seaport, the handling of the container, customs and technical/health clearance time, and trans-
portation to a warehouse. Therefore, it also contains an institutional aspect and it is not surpris-
ing that the time to import is able to explain the part of the LOP deviation caused by differences 
in institutional quality. This finding doesn’t refute the fact that institutional quality matters. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Building on the literature on the effects of national borders on deviations from the law of one 
price, I formulate the hypothesis that arbitrage is not an automatic equilibrating process, but 
rather an entrepreneurial activity. I argue that once we understand arbitrage as a productive 
entrepreneurial activity, institutional quality should be one of the determinants of arbitrage at-
tractiveness and should, therefore, influence international price dispersion. 
To test this hypothesis, I express the quality of institutions as one of the factors influencing the 
total costs of the arbitrage. The regression analysis of the data in the 1996-2009 period proves 
that institutional quality explains a significant part of the observed price dispersion defined ei-
ther as a standard deviation or mean square error. I find that the better are the institutions, the 
lower is the predicted dispersion. This shows that institutional quality explains another part of 
the price dispersion previously attributed solely to the existence of borders. The result is robust 
to changes in the specification of the estimated model. 
The major disadvantage of the institutional quality measure used is its high level of aggregation, 
which can lead to endogeneity and misidentification problems. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
regulatory quality indicator is able to explain more of the variation in the price dispersion than 
any of the other Worldwide Governance Indicators is consistent with the central hypothesis of 
this paper introduced in Section 3. Furthermore, the effect of the regulatory quality on the price 
dispersion is robust to the addition of variables explaining the general level of the development 
of the economy, and also stays significant when the tax and tax administration burden, tariffs 
and importation costs are included as explanatory variables. 
                                                             
2 All variables used are described in Appendix Table A4. 15 
 
The hypothesis that institutional quality influences the extent of the deviations from the LOP 
through the costs of arbitrage is further confirmed by the fact that the explanatory power of reg-
ulatory quality is lost only when the importation time is added to the set of explanatory va-
riables. The reason is that this variable incorporates, for example, customs and technical/health 
clearance time which is expected to be correlated with the overall institutional quality of the 
respective country. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that due to data availability limita-
tions it was not possible to directly verify the link through entrepreneurship even though the 
obtained results are consistent not only with the existence of such a link, but also with the em-
pirical literature on entrepreneurship confirming the impact of institutions on entrepreneurial 
activity. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Traded items in sample 
Food and non-alcoholic beve-
rages: perishable 
White bread (1 kg) 
Butter (500 g) 
Margarine (500 g) 
Spaghetti (1 kg)   
Flour, white (1 kg)   
Sugar, white (1 kg)   
Cheese, imported (500 g)   
Cornflakes (375 g)   
Milk, pasteurised (1 l)   
Potatoes (2 kg)   
Onions (1 kg)   
Tomatoes (1 kg)   
Carrots (1 kg)   
Oranges (1 kg)   
Apples (1 kg)   
Lemons (1 kg)   
Bananas (1 kg)   
Lettuce (one)   
Eggs (12)   
Beef: filet mignon (1 kg)   
Beef: steak, entrecote (1 kg)   
Beef: stewing, shoulder (1 kg)   
Beef: roast (1 kg)   
Beef: ground or minced (1 kg)   
Veal: chops (1 kg)   
Veal: fillet (1 kg)   
Veal: roast (1 kg)   
Lamb: leg (1 kg)   
Lamb: chops (1 kg)   
Lamb: stewing (1 kg)   
Pork: chops (1 kg)   
Pork: loin (1 kg)   
Ham: whole (1 kg)   
Bacon (1 kg)   
Chicken: fresh (1 kg)   
Fresh fish (1 kg)   
Orange juice (1 l) 
 
Food and non-alcoholic beve-
rages: non-perishable 
White rice (1 kg) 
Olive oil (1 l)    
Peanut or corn oil (1 l)   
Peas, canned (250 g)   
Tomatoes, canned (250 g)   
Peaches, canned (500 g)   
Sliced pineapples, can (500 g) 
Chicken: frozen (1 kg)   
Frozen fish fingers (1 kg)   
Instant coffee (125 g)   
Ground coffee (500 g)   
Tea bags (25 bags)   
Cocoa (250 g)   
Drinking chocolate (500 g)   
Coca-Cola (1 l)   
Tonic water (200 ml)   
Mineral water (1 l) 
 
Clothing and footwear 
Business suit, two piece, medium 
weight  
Business shirt, white  
Men’s shoes, business wear  
Men’s raincoat, Burberry type  
Socks, wool mixture  
Dress, ready to wear, daytime  
Women's shoes, town  
Women’s cardigan sweater  
Women’s raincoat, Burberry type  
Tights, panty hose   
Child’s jeans   
Child’s shoes, dresswear  
Child’s shoes, sportswear   
Girl’s dress  
Boy’s jacket, smart   
Boy’s dress trousers   
 
Alcoholic beverages 
Wine, common table (1 l)  
Wine, superior quality (700 ml)   
Wine, fine quality (700 ml)   
Beer, local brand (1 l)  
Beer, top quality (330 ml)  
Scotch whisky, 6 y old (700 ml)  
Gin, Gilbey’s or equiv. (700 ml)  
Vermouth, Martini & Rossi (1 l)  
Cognac, French VSOP  (700 ml)  
Liqueur, Cointreau (700 ml)  
 
Recreation 
Compact disc album  
Television, colour (66 cm)   
Kodak colour film (36 expos)  
International foreign daily news-
paper  
International weekly news mag-
azine (Time)  
Paperback novel (at bookstore)  
 
Personal care 
Aspirins (100 tablets)  
Razor blades (five pieces)  
Toothpaste with fluor. (120 g)  
Facial tissues (box of 100)  
Hand lotion (125 ml)  
Lipstick (deluxe type)  
 
Household supplies 
Soap (100 g)  
Laundry detergent (3 l)  
Toilet tissue (two rolls)  
Dishwashing liquid (750 ml)  
Insect-killer spray (330 g)  
Light bulbs (two, 60 watts)  
Batteries (two, size D/LR20)  
Frying pan (Teflon or good 
equivalent)  
Electric toaster (for two slices)  
 
Not included in any category 
Yoghurt, natural (150 g)   
Mushrooms (1 kg)   
Shampoo & conditioner in one 
(400 ml)  
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Table A2: Non-traded items in sample 
Non-traded 
Laundry (one shirt)  
Dry cleaning, man’s suit  
Dry cleaning, woman’s dress  
Dry cleaning, trousers  
Man’s haircut (tips included)  
Woman’s cut & blow dry (tips 
included)  
Telephone and line, monthly 
rental  
Hourly rate for domestic clean-
ing help  
Maid’s monthly wages (full time)  
Business trip, typical daily cost 
Hilton-type hotel, single room, 
one night including breakfast  
Moderate hotel, single room, one 
night including breakfast  
Babysitter’s rate per hour  
Cost of developing 36 colour 
pictures  
Daily local newspaper  
Three-course dinner for four 
people  
Four best seats at theatre or 
concert  
Four best seats at cinema  
Cost of a tune-up (but no major 
repairs) (low) 
Cost of a tune-up (but no major 
repairs) (high) 
Regular unleaded petrol (1 l)   
Taxi: initial meter charge  
Taxi rate per additional kilome-
tre  
One drink at bar of first class 
hotel  
Two-course meal for two people  
Simple meal for one person  
Fast food snack: hamburger, fries 
and drink  
Hire car, weekly rate for lowest 
price classification  
Hire car, weekly rate for mod-
erate price classification 
 
Not included in the category 
Telephone, charge per local call 
from home (3 mins) 
 




















































































Table A4: Description of used variables 
Variable  Description  N  Mean  Std. Dev. 
SD  Standard deviation of relative log prices across all 
traded products for a given pair of cities. Source: 
EIU 
13004  0.528752  0.12081 
MSE  Means square error of relative log prices across all 
traded products for a given pair of cities. Source: 
EIU 
13004  0.421107  0.297707 
Distance  Geographical distance between cities.  13004  7.120744  0.709327 
Voice and accoun-
tability 
Dimension of governance from the WGI. Captures 
to which extent a country’s citizens are able to par-
ticipate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
a free media. For each city pair the sum of levels 
attributed to the respective countries is calculated. 
Source: WGI 
10088  1.83972  1.1752 20 
 
Political stability  Dimension of governance from the WGI. Captures 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized 
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means. For each city pair the sum of levels attri-
buted to the respective countries is calculated. 
Source: WGI 
10088  1.24321  1.066992 
Government effec-
tiveness 
Dimension of governance from the WGI. Captures 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the gov-
ernment’s commitment to such policies. For each 
city pair the sum of levels attributed to the respec-
tive countries is calculated. Source: WGI 
10088  2.217464  1.317888 
Control of corrup-
tion 
Dimension of governance from the WGI. Captures 
the ability of the government to control corruption. 
For each city pair the sum of levels attributed to the 
respective countries is calculated. Source: WGI 
10088  2.115712  1.534505 
Rule of law  Dimension of governance from the WGI. Captures 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, the 
courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. For 
each city pair the sum of levels attributed to the 
respective countries is calculated. Source: WGI 
10088  1.960842  1.348987 
Regulatory quality  Dimension of governance from the WGI. Captures 
the ability of the government to formulate and im-
plement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. For each 
city pair the sum of levels attributed to the respec-
tive countries is calculated. Source: WGI 
10088  1.935048  1.129872 
Diff. in  reg. quali-
ty 
See above. For each city pair an absolute-value 
difference of levels attributed to the respective 
countries is calculated. Source: WGI 
10088  0.841026  0.792292 
School enroll-
ment, tertiary 
Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enroll-
ment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of 
education shown. Tertiary education, whether or 
not to an advanced research qualification, normally 
requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the 
successful completion of education at the second-
ary level. For each city pair the sum of levels attri-
buted to the respective countries is calculated. 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
9015  96.37729  27.77875 
Total tax rate  Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and 
mandatory contributions payable by businesses 
after accounting for allowable deductions and ex-
emptions as a share of commercial profits. Taxes 
withheld (such as personal income tax) or collected 
and remitted to the tax authorities (such as value 
added taxes, sales taxes or goods and service taxes) 
are excluded. For each city pair the sum of levels 
attributed to the respective countries is calculated. 
3981  97.19673  20.2592 21 
 
Source: World Bank 
Time to prepare 
and pay taxes 
Time to prepare and pay taxes is the time, in hours 
per year, it takes to prepare, file, and pay (or with-
hold) three major types of taxes: the corporate 
income tax, the value added or sales tax, and labor 
taxes, including payroll taxes and social security 
contributions. For each city pair the sum of levels 
attributed to the respective countries is calculated. 
Source: World Bank 
3981  561.2457  400.4576 
Tariff rate  Simple mean applied tariff is the unweighted aver-
age of the effectively applied rates for all products 
subject to tariffs calculated for all traded goods. For 
each city pair the sum of levels attributed to the 
respective countries is calculated. Source: World 
Bank 
10056  7.417708  3.217913 
Importation costs   Cost measures the fees levied on a 20-foot contain-
er in U.S. dollars. All the fees associated with com-
pleting the procedures to export or import the 
goods are included. These include costs for docu-
ments, administrative fees for customs clearance 
and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal 
handling charges and inland transport. The cost 
measure does not include tariffs or trade taxes. 
Only official costs are recorded. For each city pair 
the sum of levels attributed to the respective coun-
tries is calculated. Source: World Bank 
3981  2552.818  977.3354 
Importation time  Time is recorded in calendar days. The time calcula-
tion for a procedure starts from the moment it is 
initiated and runs until it is completed. If a proce-
dure can be accelerated for an additional cost, the 
fastest legal procedure is chosen. It is assumed that 
neither the exporter nor the importer wastes time 
and that each commits to completing each remain-
ing procedure without delay. Procedures that can 
be completed in parallel are measured as simulta-
neous. The waiting time between procedures – for 
example, during the unloading of cargo –  is in-
cluded in the measure. For each city pair the sum of 
levels attributed to the respective countries is cal-
culated. Source: World Bank 
3981  37.71314  26.69093 
GDP per capita  PPP GDP per capita in current international dollar. 
Source: IMF 
9955  49062.32  18255.91 
SD of food: pe-
rishable 
Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
perishable food items for a given pair of cities. 
Source: EIU 
13004  0.477965  0.124553 
SD of food: non-
perishable 
Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
non-perishable food items for a given pair of cities. 
Source: EIU 
13004  0.481621  0.126029 
SD of clothing  Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
clothing and footwear items for a given pair of ci-
ties. Source: EIU 
12886  0.408302  0.120075 22 
 
SD of alcohol  Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
alcoholic beverages for a given pair of cities. 
Source: EIU 
12973  0.414298  0.162324 
SD of recreation  Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
recreation products for a given pair of cities. 
Source: EIU 
13004  0.320432  0.177225 
SD of personal  Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
personal care products for a given pair of cities. 
Source: EIU 
12973  0.477303  0.232974 
SD of household  Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
household supplies items for a given pair of cities. 
Source: EIU 
13004  0.464138  0.143282 
SD of non-traded  Standard deviation of relative log prices across 
non-traded items for a given pair of cities. Source: 
EIU 
13004  0.555712  0.186385 
SD of all  Standard deviation of relative log prices across all 
items for a given pair of cities. Source: EIU 
13004  0.553605  0.140432 
 
 
Table A5: Worldwide Governance Indicators’ explanatory power 
Dependent variable: Standard devia-
tion 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












             












             












             












             












             












             












             












Observations  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088 
Adjusted R2  0.489  0.500  0.527  0.520  0.462  0.523 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; variance is clustered at the country-pair level. All specifica-
tions include year fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 23 
 
Table A6: Robustness checks: Individual product categories 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Dependent variable:  SD of food: 
perishable 















SD of all 


















                   


















                   


















                   


















Observations  10088  10088  9970  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088  10088 
Adjusted R2  0.441  0.317  0.287  0.284  0.474  0.199  0.069  0.399  0.552 




Table A7: Robustness checks: Various aspects of the institutional framework 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















         








         








         








         










         








         








         








         








Observations  1896  1896  1896  1896 
Adjusted R2  0.493  0.349  0.532  0.377 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; variance is clustered at the country-pair level. All specifica-
tions include year fixed effects. All explanatory variables but regulatory quality, border, and distance re-
calculated to [0-1]. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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